Rationing by waiting time is commonly used in health care systems with zero or low money prices. Some systems prioritise particular types of patient and o¤er them lower waiting times. We investigate whether prioritisation is welfare improving when the bene…t from treatment is the sum of two components, one of which is not observed by providers. We show that positive prioritisation (shorter waits for patients with higher observable bene…t) is welfare improving if the mean observable bene…t of the patients who are indi¤erent about receiving the treatment is smaller than the mean observable bene…t of the patients who receive the treatment. This is true (a) if the distribution of the unobservable bene…t is uniform for any distribution of the observable bene…t; or (b) if the distribution of the observable bene…t is uniform and the distribution of the unobservable bene…t is log-concave. We also show that prioritisation is never welfare increasing if and only if the distribution of unobservable bene…t is negative exponential.
Introduction
In many countries with tax or public health insurance …nance elective surgery is rationed by waiting. In Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom, average waiting times for common procedures, such as hip and knee replacement, cataract surgery or varicose veins, vary from three to eight months (Siciliani and Hurst, 2004) .
Some countries have explicit waiting-time prioritisation for certain types of treatment. Schemes can have a limited number of priority categories, as in Spain and Sweden (high-priority and low-priority) and in Australia and Italy (recommended admission within 30 days, 90 days and 12 months). More elaborate priority scoring systems, as in New Zealand and Canada, assign points to patients and patients with higher scores have shorter waits 2005 , section 3.2.1).
In the New Zealand points scheme for cataract, patients with "lens induced glaucoma" are assigned 71-90 points, whilst those categorised as "cataract extraction required in order to treat posterior segment disease", are assigned 51-70 points. All other patients receive up to 50 points according to the following criteria: "visual acuity score" (max 5 points), "clinical modi…ers" (max 5 points), "severity of visual impairment" (max 10 points), "ability to work, give care, live independently" (max 5 points), "other disability" (max 5 points). Patients with the maximum number of points wait four weeks, while patients with only 20 points wait six months. Patients scoring less than 20 are "deferrable" (i.e. they are not o¤ered treatment and are sent back to the GP for "active care and review"). Similar criteria have been developed for hip and knee replacement, and other common elective procedures. 1 We examine the welfare e¤ects of two possible prioritisation schemes: 1) linear prioritisation, under which a patient's waiting time is linearly related to their observable bene…t; 2) threshold rationing, under which all patients whose observable bene…t exceeds a threshold are o¤ered immediate treatment and all those with lower observable bene…t are subject to linear prioritisation.
If patient bene…t from a treatment is perfectly observable by providers, rationing by waiting is ine¢ cient since it imposes costs on patients which are not o¤set by gains to producers. Longer waiting times reduce the value of a treatment because of lost expected bene…t, temporary discomfort and pain, and, for some pathologies, the higher risk of permanent reductions in health. With perfect information providers can treat high-bene…t patients with no costly wait and refuse treatment to those with low bene…t.
But patient bene…t from treatment is not fully observable by providers because of unobservable patient preferences or characteristics. Patients know their characteristics and, after consultation with their medical advisors, are better informed about their bene…t than providers. They use their information in deciding whether to join the waiting list. When there is no prioritisation all patients face the same waiting time and so the patients who join the list and get treatment have higher bene…ts than those who do not join the waiting list.
Providers can usually observe some characteristics of the patient, such as age, which convey information about the bene…t. Suppose that bene…t is negatively correlated with age. The provider can prioritise patients by o¤ering lower waiting times for younger patients. Prioritisation increases the number of young patients treated and reduces the number of old patients treated. The welfare of the young is increased and the welfare of the old is reduced. But since some young patients may have low bene…t, and some old patients may have high bene…t, and prioritisation reallocates treatment to the young, it is unclear a priori whether prioritisation based on the imperfect signal increases overall welfare compared to no prioritisation.
We show that linear prioritisation improves welfare if the average age of patients who are indi¤erent between obtaining the treatment after some wait or not obtaining the treatment at all, is higher than the average age of the patients receiving treatment. The reason is that prioritisation changes the total time waited and leads to the treatment of more young people and fewer old people. Treating more young and fewer old has no welfare e¤ect since the marginal old and marginal young patients are indi¤erent about treatment taking into account their waiting time. Hence prioritisation is welfare increasing if it reduces the total waiting time of the infra-marginal patients. Since waiting time increases with age in our example, total waiting time is reduced if the mean age of the treated is less than the mean age of the indi¤erent.
The condition that the average age of patients who are indi¤erent between getting treatment or not, is higher than the average age of the patients receiving treatment is satis…ed by several distributions of age and unobserv-able bene…ts. Examples include (i) a uniform distribution of the unobservable bene…t and (ii) a log concave distribution of unobservable bene…t and a uniform distribution of the observable bene…t. 2 We show that linear prioritisation is not welfare increasing if and only if the unobservable component of health gain has a negative exponential distribution. With a negative exponential distribution of the unobservable component, the mean age of patients who are indi¤erent about joining the waiting list is the same as the mean age of those who do join.
Under threshold rationing patients whose observable bene…t exceeds a threshold are o¤ered immediate treatment and all those with lower observable bene…t are subject to waiting-time prioritisation. We show that, if for a given threshold the minimum wait is zero, an increase in the threshold is welfare improving.
The main results on the e¤ects of prioritisation hold when there is also a private sector alternative providing treatment at a money price but with a zero wait. The rationale is that marginal changes in the prioritisation regime in the public health sector alter individuals' choices between treatment in the public sector, treatment in the private sector, and no treatment. But the welfare loss for these marginal individuals who shift is zero since they were indi¤erent between their choice before and after the change in the public sector prioritisation rule. Hence the welfare e¤ect of the change is the change in the total time waited by patients in the public sector and so the results for the simpler case where the only alternative to public treatment is no treatment continue to apply.
Most of the theoretical literature on rationing by waiting assumes that all patients have the same waiting time (Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 1984; Bucovetsky, 1984; Hoel and Saether, 2003; Farnworth, 2003; Gravelle, Dusheiko and Sutton, 2002; Iversen, 1997; Martin and Smith, 1999; . 3 An exception is Barros and Olivella (2005) in which the public sector does not treat patients with bene…t below a threshold level and patients with bene…t above the threshold will wait for treatment in the public sector. However, the threshold is treated as exogenous as the focus is on the incentives for doctors who work in both the private and public sectors to creamskim and the question of whether prioritisation is welfare enhancing is not considered.
Our focus is on the optimal way to use waiting times to allocate a …xed supply of a particular treatment amongst potential patients. It is thus com-2 A distribution is log-concave if the hazard rate is monotonically increasing, which is satis…ed by many common distributions like the Normal, the Chi-square and Gamma distribution (Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005) .
3 For a review of the literature see Cullis, Jones and Propper (2000) .
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plementary to two related literatures on the optimal allocation of a given health care budget across di¤erent treatments (Garber, 2000; Gravelle and Siciliani, 2007b; Smith 2005 ) and on the use of waiting time and money prices to ration access to treatment (Bucovetsky, 1984; Gravelle and Siciliani, 2007a; Hoel and Saether, 2003; Marchand and Schroyen, 2005; and Olivella, 2003) . Section 2 presents the main features of the model and establishes the e¤ects of prioritisation on welfare; section 3 extends the analysis to threshold rationing; section 4 contains an illustration with uniform distributions. Section 5 shows that the main results hold when there is a private sector alternative to treatment in the public sector, when the social welfare function weights the utility of individuals by their observable bene…t, and when the cost of treatment varies with the observable part of patient bene…t. Section 6 concludes.
Linear prioritisation 2.1 Model speci…cation
We initially assume that the alternative to treatment in the public sector is no treatment. Section 5 considers the case where there is also private sector treatment.
A public sector provider wishes to allocate a …xed supply z of treatment to a population of potential patients to maximise welfare. The health gain from treatment is b a, where a is observable by the provider but b is not. To …x ideas we interpret a as age: old patients have lower health gain, given their other characteristics which determine b, than young patients. b and a are distributed according to the joint density f (a; b) over the support a 2 [0; a]; b 2 0; b .
Patient utility with treatment is b a w where w is waiting time. 4 Patients, possibly after consulting their general practitioner, know both their b and a and join the waiting list if b a w.
Our speci…cation di¤ers from the original formulation of the model of rationing by waiting by Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) in two respects. In their model (and in others such as Farnworth (2003)) patients have a cost c > 0 of getting on a waiting list for treatment. For example, a patient may incur a cost of attending an outpatient clinic to see a specialist who will agree that they need treatment and place them on the waiting list. Lindsay and Feigenbaum assume that the bene…t from an operation received after a wait of w has a present value of be rw and that the patient decides to join the list if and only if be rw c. With c > 0, increases in the waiting time reduce the demand because the present value of the bene…t from treatment is reduced relative to cost of joining the list. If c is zero all patients with b > 0 join the waiting list and demand is una¤ected by the waiting time.
Assuming that there is a positive cost of joining a list which must be incurred before the health bene…ts are realised seems plausible for rationing by list for elective hospital treatment where patients must …rst be seen by a specialist in order to join the list.
The evidence suggests that many individuals do not use exponential discounting of health (Cairns and van der Pol, 2000) but instead use a variety of discounting functions, including hyperbolic discounting (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992) where the discounted health bene…t is b(1 + w) = .
We assume utility is linear in the waiting time since exponential or hyperbolic discounting do not yield tractable models. Moreover, in the hyperbolic case, the discounted bene…t from treatment is quite well approximated by a linear function for positive waiting time as becomes large. But when utility from treatment is linear in the waiting time, c has no role in the model and we drop it to reduce notational clutter. Thus we assume that b is the unobserved bene…t from treatment net of the cost of joining the list b b 0 c. b 0 is distributed between c and some upper limit b 0 , so that b is distributed between 0 and b = b 0 c.
The linear speci…cation means that the model also applies to the case of rationing by waiting in line (queuing), as for example in accident and emergency departments and GP surgeries. Potential patients will baulk at the queue if it is so long that their bene…t from treatment is less than the opportunity cost of the time they would have to spend in the queue (which we assume is proportional to the waiting time). In this case we also do not need to assume there is a cost to joining the queue and can again set c = 0.
Since a is observable it is possible to make waiting time of a patient depend on a. We consider a linear points rationing scheme in which patients of age a receive p 2 a points when placed on the waiting list and then accumulate points at the rate p 1 w the longer they wait. 5 We assume that p 1 > 0; otherwise waiting time would have no interesting role in the scheme. There is no prioritisation according to age when p 2 = 0. If p 2 > 0 there is positive prioritisation, so that those with a higher observed bene…t (lower age) have a shorter waiting time. It is possible in principle to have negative prioritisation (p 2 < 0) so those with a lower observed bene…t (higher age) have a shorter waiting time. We focus on the more intuitive case of positive prioritisation, mainly using the logical possibility of negative prioritisation to show that, except in one very special case, some form of prioritisation (positive or negative) is welfare increasing. We do however provide in section 4 an example of negative prioritisation being welfare increasing.
In each period patients with the highest number of points are treated. Patients who get treatment will have accumulated the same number of points P , so that p 1 w p 2 a = P . Hence the waiting time for a patient of age a is [P + p 2 a]=p 1 = w 0 + pa where w 0 = P=p 1 is the minimum waiting time and p = p 2 =p 1 . Only patients whose health gain, b a, is at least w 0 + pa will join the waiting list.
De…ne b b(a; w 0 ; p) = a(1 + p) + w 0 as the critical level of private bene…t, which makes a patient of given age indi¤erent between receiving the treatment or not. De…ne b a = minf b w 0 1+p ; ag as the maximum age at which a patient will want to join the waiting list. The demand for treatment is (see Gravelle and Siciliani, 2006 ; Appendix)
Since b b(a; w 0 ; p) = a(1 + p) + w 0 an increase in p or in w 0 will increase the minimum b at which the patient wants to join the waiting list. Hence increases in p or in w 0 will reduce demand:
The system is in equilibrium when the number of patients joining the list in each period equals the supply of treatment:
which yields the minimum equilibrium wait (for the youngest patients) as w 0 = w 0 (p), where we suppress the dependence of w 0 on supply z to reduce notational clutter. Increases in p reduce the minimum wait:
The wait for a patient of age a is w(a; p) = w 0 (p) +pa. When p = 0 there is no prioritisation and all patients who join the list have the same wait w 0 (0) irrespective of age. Figure 1 illustrates. If there was no waiting time all patients with b a would join the list and demand would be equal to the mass of patients above the 45 o line. We assume that demand at zero waiting time always exceeds the supply z. With no prioritisation there is a positive waiting time of w 0 (0) = OA for patients of all ages and only those with b w 0 (0) a join the list. Thus demand would be equal to the mass of patients in ACH. With positive prioritisation only patients with b w 0 (p) a(1 + p) > a join the list. The minimum wait (enjoyed by patients with a = 0) is w 0 (p) = OD, and demand is the mass of patients in DEH.
The e¤ect of an increase in p on the waiting time of a patient of age a is dw(a; p) dp
where E(a j I) is the mean age of the patients who are indi¤erent about joining the list. An increase in p increases the wait of older patients (a > E(a j I)) and reduces the wait of younger patients (a < E(a j I)).
The e¤ect of increased prioritisation on the total time waited by patients on the list is d dp
where
is the mean age of patients who demand treatment. The …rst term in the square bracket in the last line of (5) is the e¤ect of prioritisation on the waiting time of infra marginal patients, and the second the e¤ect on the waiting times of patients who were indi¤erent. Thus increased prioritisation (an increase in p) may increase or reduce the total time waited by patients on the list.
Welfare and prioritisation
With …xed supply the utilitarian welfare function is
The policy problem is to choose p to maximise S subject to the constraint that the minimum wait cannot be negative: w 0 0. Since @w 0 =@p < 0, the constraint w 0 0 can be rewritten as e p p 0 (where w 0 (e p) = 0). Without further restrictions on the distribution of private and observable bene…t the welfare function may not be concave in p so that …rst order conditions are necessary rather than su¢ cient (see Gravelle and Siciliani, 2006, Appendix) Negative prioritisation is counter-intuitive and we concentrate on the other cases. We do however provide in section 4.3 an example where negative prioritisation is welfare increasing. Figure 1 illustrates the e¤ect of positive prioritisation on the demand for treatment and on total waiting time. We assume in Figure 1 that the distributions of a and b are independent and uniform. When there is no prioritisation all potential patients face the same waiting time of OA = w 0 (0). The line AC with slope of 1 plots b = w 0 (p) + a and patients in 8 the area ACH where with b w 0 (p) + a demand treatment. These are the patients with the highest health bene…t b a. If private bene…t b were observable it would be optimal to provide treatment, with a zero wait, only to the patients in area ACH and to refuse treatment to all other patients. Thus rationing by waiting with no prioritisation ensures an optimal selection of patients for treatment since the same patients would be treated under full information and with no prioritisation. But with no prioritisation welfare is lower than under full information because of the waiting time costs imposed on the patients in ACH.
With prioritisation all patients whose unobservable bene…t b exceeds w 0 (p) + a(1 + p) join the waiting list for treatment. The line DE with slope (1 + p) plotsb = w 0 (p) + a(1 + p) and OD = w 0 (p). All patients in area DEH demand treatment. Prioritisation increases demand from young patients (with age a < a B ) since those in area ABD now join the waiting list. Conversely old patients (a > a B ) in area BCE who used to demand treatment now do not join the list. The mass of patients in ABD equals that in BCE since total demand is unchanged. In Figure 1 ABD and BCE have the same area because b and a are independently and uniformly distributed.
With prioritisation the waiting time (w 0 + pa) for a patient aged a is the vertical distance between the 45 o line and the line DE plottingb = a + w 0 + pa. Thus total time waited with prioritisation is the area ODEF. With no prioritisation total time waited is the area OACG. Area OACG equals ODECG since ABD equals BCE. Since ODECG exceeds ODEF by CEFG, total time waited is reduced by prioritisation. However, the new young patients in ABD have smaller health gains b a than the displaced old patients in BCE, so that the welfare e¤ect of prioritisation is a priori ambiguous.
A more formal analysis is thus required to investigate the e¤ect of prioritisation. The marginal welfare e¤ect of introducing prioritisation is, using (5) and remembering thatb = a +w(a; p), dS(w 0 (p); p) dp = d dp
Hence we have Proposition 1 Starting from a regime with no prioritisation, positive (negative) prioritisation is welfare improving if the average age of the patients who are indi¤ erent between receiving treatment or not, E(a j I), is larger (smaller) than the average age of the patients receiving treatment, E(a j T ).
Similarly, if prioritisation is already positive, intensifying (dampening) it is welfare improving if E(a j I) > (<)E(a j T ).
Varying p has two e¤ects: it changes the total waiting time and it changes the age mix of those treated via the changes in the critical bene…tb at which individuals of given age seek treatment. The change in the age mix of the treated has no welfare e¤ect since the marginal old and marginal young patients are indi¤erent about treatment taking into account their waiting time: the …rst and last terms in the second line of (8) cancel.
Rationing by waiting imposes deadweight losses on patients in order to allocate scarce capacity. Prioritisation increases welfare because it makes the marginal indi¤erent patients more sensitive to waiting times than the inframarginal. Thus a smaller deadweight loss is required to limit demand. When indi¤erent patients are older than inframarginal treated patients making the old wait longer will increase the e¤ect of waiting time on demand and so reduce deadweight loss from waiting.
In Figure 1 , where a and b are independently uniformly distributed, the average age of treated patients in ACH is less than the average age of the indi¤erent on AC because the young are more likely to demand treatment. Hence introducing positive prioritisation (p > 0: shorter waits for the young) will reduce total waiting time and increase welfare.
It is only under very special assumptions about the distribution of observable and unobservable components of health gain that (positive or negative) prioritisation is never welfare improving:
Proposition 2 Prioritisation is welfare increasing at some supply level unless f (a; b) = h(a) e b .
When there is no prioritisation the market clearing waiting time faced by all patients of all ages is w 0 (0; z) (where we temporarily show the dependence of w 0 on supply). Since, from (8),
welfare can be increased by either a small positive or negative p unless E(a j I) = E(a j T ). Indi¤erent potential patients lie along the line AC in Figure 1 whereb = a + w 0 (p; z). If the mean age of patients along this line is independent of w 0 (and hence of z) then the mean age of the patients with b >b who demand treatment is also independent of w 0 and is equal to the mean age of the indi¤erent patients. The negative exponential distribution ensures that this special type of invariance of the distributions of age conditional on w 0 holds:
and it is the only distribution with this property. We can …nd assumptions about the distribution of a and b which ensure that E(a j I) > E(a j T ) holds for all p, so dS=dp > 0 for all p, and therefore maximal prioritisation is optimal. Hence, in this case the more intuitively plausible positive form -shorter waits for the young -maximises welfare.
Proposition 3 Suppose that a and b are independently distributed over the rectangular support a 2 [0; a]; b 2 0; b so that f (a; b) = h(a)g(b). Then maximal prioritisation is optimal (p = e p and w 0 = 0) if (i) h(a) is uniform and g(b) is log-concave; or if (ii) g(b) is uniform (for any h(a)).
The requirement of independence of a and b may appear to be restrictive but note that it relates to the two components of health gain, not to the joint distribution of health gain and its observable component. The covariance of a and health gain b a is Cov(b a; a) = Cov(b; a) V ar(a) so that even if b and a are uncorrelated a is informative about health gain.
If h(a) is uniform, then the average ages of treated patients and indi¤er-ent patients are
Intuitively, since G(b) G b b is decreasing in a while g( b b) can take any shape, it follows that the …rst distribution tends to give a higher weight to patients with low age and it tends to be less favourable compared to g( b b).
The log-concavity of g(b) ensures that this is always the case. Log-concavity is satis…ed by many common distributions like the Normal, Chi-squared and Gamma distribution. If g(b) is uniform then the average age of the population in a 2 [0;â], b 2 [0; b] is equal to the average age of the indi¤ erent patients: E(a j a 2 [0;â]) = E(a j I). 6 The average age of the patients treated at given b cannot exceed the average age of the population in a 2 [0;â] at the same b
where the inequality is strict for b 2 [w 0 ; (1+p)â+w 0 ]. Hence the average age of the treated over b 2 [w 0 ; b] is less than the average age of the population in a 2 [0;â], and so is less than the average age of the indi¤erent: E(a j T ) < E(a j a 2 [0;â]) = E(a j I) (see Gravelle and Siciliani, 2006 , Appendix, for full details).
Threshold rationing
We now consider a more general threshold rationing system. Patients whose age is below a given threshold a 0 (i.e. young patients) are given immediate treatment with zero waiting time. Patients with a a 0 are prioritised (as in the previous section) and wait according to w(a; p; a 0 ) = w 0 +p (a a 0 ). The previous analysis had a 0 = 0 so that threshold rationing is more general in that it allows younger patients to receive treatment without delay. It includes the case in which the threshold is set so high that all the supply is used to treat young patients with no delay and old patients are denied treatment (face an in…nite waiting time).
For patients with a a 0 , the lowest unobserved bene…t at which they will demand treatment is b b(a; w 0 ; p; a 0 ) = a + p(a a 0 ) + w 0 , and b a = minf( b w 0 +pa 0 )(1+p) 1 ; ag is the highest age. The demand for treatment 6 If a and b are independently distributed, then:
is the sum of demands from those who do not have to wait (a < a 0 ) and those who do:
where D a 0 > 0, D p < 0 and D w 0 < 0. The market-clearing condition is D (a 0 ; p; w 0 ) = z, from which we obtain w 0 = w 0 (p; a 0 ). In Figure 2 , under maximal prioritisation with a zero threshold (p = p , w 0 = 0, a 0 = 0) only patients in area OAB demand treatment (and wait w(a; p; a 0 ) = p a). If the threshold a 0 is set so that the patients with zero wait get all the supply, then patients in area OCDB are treated.
Welfare is
with S a 0 > 0, S w 0 < 0 and S p < 0 (see Gravelle and Siciliani, 2006, Appendix) . For …xed a 0 the optimal p maximises the second term in (12) subject to w 0 (p; a 0 ) 0 or equivalentlyp(a 0 ) p, with @p=@a 0 = D a 0 (w 0 ; p; a 0 )=D p (w 0 ; p; a 0 ). The Lagrangean is
All the previous results apply to this …rst stage problem. Once we have optimised with respect to p, we obtain
Using the envelope theorem,
If prioritisation is maximal then the minimum wait is zero (w 0 = 0) and 13 the …rst term in (13) is zero, and p =p(a 0 ). Hence,
which can be rearranged as:
E(a j I; a a 0 ) and E(a j T; a a 0 ) are the average age of patients who are indi¤erent (I) or treated (T ) and have an age at least as high as the threshold a 0 . Suppose that, for a given a 0 , optimal prioritisation is maximal (p =p(a 0 ) and w 0 = 0). This implies that E(a j I; a a 0 ) E(a j T; a a 0 ) so that dS =da 0 0 and increasing the threshold will increase welfare.
If prioritisation is not maximal for a given a 0 , the constraint is not binding, p <p, w 0 > 0 and = 0. Hence, (see Gravelle and Siciliani, 2006, Appendix) 
which is indeterminate as the …rst two terms are positive while the third term is negative. Summarising:
Proposition 4 If at threshold a 0 the optimal prioritisation is maximal (p = p(a 0 ) and w 0 (p ) = 0) and E(a j I; a a 0 ) > E(a j T; a a 0 ) then welfare can be increased by increasing the threshold.
The proposition is only local but it has the corollary that a su¢ cient condition for a positive threshold to be optimal is that when there is no threshold (a 0 = 0), the optimal degree of prioritisation is maximal (p =p(0) and w 0 (p ) = 0) and the average age of the indi¤erent is greater than the average age of the treated: E(a j I; a a 0 = 0) > E(a j T; a a 0 = 0).
An illustration: uniform distributions
We now use the simple cases with uniform distributions to illustrate the gains from prioritisation and threshold rationing, and to provide an example of negative prioritisation.
Prioritisation
Assume that a; b are independently and uniformly distributed with support a 2 [0; 1] and b 2 [0; 1]. Refer to Figure 3 . Prioritisation bene…ts all the young patients in area DBFH: those in ABFH were treated before but now have a shorter wait. The gain from prioritisation for a patient of age a in ABFH who was previously treated is the vertical distance between AB and DB at a. Young patients in ABD were not previously treated but now join the waiting list because they face a shorter waiting time. The average gain from prioritisation for them is given by the vertical distance between the lines PB and DB at that age (where the distance AP = DP because of the uniform distribution of b).
Old patients in BCF lose. Those with a 2 (a B ; a E ] in area BFE still join the list but now face a longer wait. Those with a 2 (a B ; a E ] in area BLE do not join the list. Their average loss at given a is the vertical distance between BI and BL at that a. Old patients with a 2 (a E ; a C ] previously joined the list and were treated but now no longer join the list because of the increased wait they would face. The average loss from prioritisation for displaced old patients of age a 2 (a E ; a C ) is the vertical distance between IC and LC at that age. First, consider the young patients aged a = a B in BFGJ and old patients aged a B + in BEF, where 2 (0; a E a B ]. By similar triangles the loss by an old patient aged a B + equals the gain of a young patient at a B but there are more young patients at any given in BFGJ than old patients in BEF so the total gain to young patients in BFGJ exceeds the total loss of old patients in BEF. Second, compare the displaced old patients in BLE aged a B + and new young patients in BJK aged a B where GF equals FE. The average gain to the young patient at a B equals the average loss by the old patient at a B + . By similar triangles there are the same number of new young patients at a B and displaced old patients at a B + . Hence the gains and losses for these two groups cancel. Third, consider the displaced old patients in CEL and the new young patients in DKJA. Since the total demand is unchanged and area BKJ equals area BLE, we must have the same number of new young patients in DKJA as displaced old patients in CEL. The maximum average loss at any given age for old patients in CEL is the distance IL which is equal to the minimum average gain for new young patients in DKJA. Hence the total gain to new young patients in DKJA exceeds the total loss to displaced old patients in CEL. Finally, prioritisation makes old patients in AJGH better o¤ and there are no old patient losses unaccounted for. Thus, prioritisation increases welfare in the case of independent uniform distributions of a and b.
More formally, if there is no threshold rationing (a 0 = 0), the demand function is (1) and
In equilibrium demand equals supply z, so that
Prioritisation is welfare improving since dS dp = @S @w 0 dw 0 dp
Proposition 5 If a; b are independently and uniformly distributed and there is no threshold (a 0 = 0), optimal prioritisation is maximal with p = 1 2z
1, w 0 = 0, w (a; p ; z) = 1 2z 1 a.
Prioritisation reduces the total waiting time of infra-marginal patients but also reduces the average health gain (b a) of treated patients. If the densities of observed and observed bene…t are uniform, the …rst e¤ect dominates: the higher welfare from a reduction in waiting times outweighs the reduction in welfare from suboptimal selection of patients.
Threshold rationing
Suppose now that the threshold is positive (a 0 > 0) so that patients with a < a 0 are given immediate treatment with zero waiting time and patients with a a 0 wait according to w(a) = w 0 + p (a a 0 ). The demand function (11) is
and the minimum wait is
and welfare (12) is
Substituting (22) in S, the derivative of S with respect to p is positive and so, for a given a 0 , prioritisation is again maximal with
Note that the pure prioritisation solution is a special case of this with a 0 = 0. Substitutingp(a 0 ) and w 0 (a 0 ;p(a 0 )) in the welfare function and di¤erentiat-ing with respect to the threshold we can show (Gravelle and Siciliani, 2006 , Appendix) that increases in a 0 increase welfare. The optimal policy is to increase a 0 until all of the available capacity is allocated to young patients with a < a 0 , and old patients with a a 0 demand none of the capacity because they face an in…nite waiting time. Using the market clearing condition to solve for a 0 we have Proposition 6 If a; b are independently and uniformly distributed, it is always optimal to provide the treatment only to patients for whom a is below the threshold level a 0 , where a 0 = 1 (1 2z) 1=2 . Figure 4 compares welfare at various capacity levels for the …rst best, simple rationing by waiting where all patients have the same wait, waiting with optimal prioritisation, and threshold rationing. We express the capacity as a proportion of the maximum potential demand with no waiting time or prioritisation, which is (see the demand functions) 1=2.
The waiting time and welfare under simple rationing by waiting are found by setting p = 0 in (18) and (19). In the …rst best providers can observe both b and a and allocate treatment to those with the highest health gain (b) until capacity is exhausted. The patients treated would be the same as those under simple rationing by waiting, who join the list by comparing their health gain with the waiting time. Hence the …rst best welfare is the welfare under simple rationing plus the avoided total waiting time of w 0 (0)D(w 0 (0); 0). Figure 4 shows that the form of rationing makes more di¤erence the smaller the available capacity relative to the maximum potential demand. For example, with capacity equal to 25% of potential demand, simple rationing by waiting produces about one half of the welfare from prioritisation and about one third of the welfare from threshold rationing. But with capacity of 75%, simple rationing by waiting produces over 4/5th of the welfare from prioritisation and 2/3rd of the welfare from threshold rationing. Notice also that the form of rationing a¤ects the marginal value of additional capacity (the slope of the welfare functions with respect to capacity). The marginal value of capacity is increasing under simple rationing by waiting, constant under prioritisation, and decreasing under pure threshold rationing and the …rst best.
Negative prioritisation
We now give a simple example of negative prioritisation. The density f (a; b) is uniform over the non-rectangular support of the a 2 [0; a]; b 2 [0; b 0 + da]. The average age of the indi¤erent is
The average age of the treated is
so that E( aj I) > E( aj T ) if (1 + p) > d. Hence introducing positive prioritisation is welfare improving if d < 1 (as we assumed in the previous examples in this section where d = 0). If d > 1 then introducing negative prioritisation is welfare improving. This is the case illustrated in Figure 5 where the average age of the treated in ABDC exceeds the average age of the indi¤erent along AB. This example also provides a tractable case where the observable and unobservable components of health gain are not independently distributed since the expected unobserved bene…t conditional on age E( bj a) = b 0 + da =2 is increasing in age. The expected health gain from treatment conditional on age is E( b aj a) = b 0 + (d 2)a =2 which is decreasing in age if d < 2. Thus when d 2 (1; 2) giving priority to the old is welfare increasing even though expected health bene…ts conditional on age are decreasing. The example is useful in emphasising that the crucial question to be answered in deciding whether to give shorter waits to the young is whether doing so reduces the total time waited, not whether the expected health gain conditional on age is decreasing or increasing in age.
Extensions

Prioritisation with a private sector
It is possible to show that the main result obtained above still holds when patients also have the option of private treatment at a money price k and no wait. Suppose that patient utility if not treated is u(y), where u is increasing and strictly concave in income y. Utility if treated in the public sector after a prioritised wait of w 0 + pa is u(y) + b w 0 (1 + p)a. Utility if treated in the private sector is u(y k) + b a. Prioritisation is based on the observable component of the health gain from treatment (a), not income. Age, unobservable bene…t, and income are distributed on the support a 2 [0; a]; b 2 0; b ; y 2 y; y with joint density f (a; b; y).
To demand public treatment patients must, as before, prefer public treatment to no treatment. Hence public patients must have a minimum unobservable bene…t of b b = w 0 + (1 + p)a and a maximum age ofâ. Public patients must also prefer public to private treatment:
Since G y = u y (y) u y (y k) < 0, there is a unique income y G (w 0 + pa) such that all individuals with y y G prefer public to private treatment and all those with y > y G prefer private to public treatment. The demand for public treatment is
which is increasing in the charge for private treatment and decreasing in w 0 and p.
Welfare is the sum of the utilities of public patients, private patients and those who are not treated. The contribution from the utility of patients who choose to be treated in the public sector is
An increase in the degree of prioritisation (an increase in p) has no e¤ect on the utility of private patients and those who decide not to be treated. It has a direct e¤ect on the utility of public patients and it also alters the number of private patients and the untreated. Since individuals make privately optimal decisions about whether to be treated in the public or private sector or not to be treated, the patients who shift between choices as a result of the change in p are no worse or better o¤: they are indi¤erent between the public and private treatment or between public treatment and no treatment. Hence the welfare e¤ect of a marginal change in p arises only via the change in (27) holding constant the number indi¤erent between the public sector and no treatment, and the number indi¤erent between the public and private sectors. The marginal welfare e¤ect of prioritisation is (see Gravelle and Siciliani, 2006, Appendix) dS G dp
Hence we have a generalisation of Proposition 1.
Proposition 7 When public health care is rationed by waiting and private health care is rationed by price, positive prioritisation in the public sector is welfare increasing if the average age of those indi¤ erent about public treatment is bigger than the average age of those treated in the public sector.
Non-utilitarian welfare function
The welfare function (7) is utilitarian: the utility of all individuals have the same welfare weight. It is possible to allow for di¤erent value judgements by attaching a weight m(a; b) to the utility functions b a w. The welfare function is then
where, without loss of generality we scale the weighting function so that f m integrates to 1. For example, we might want to examine the implications of the judgement that the health gains of old patients should receive a greater weight than those of the young. Proceeding as in section 2.2, we get
where D m and E m ( aj T ) are "demand"and "average age"of treated patients evaluated using the value weighted density function f m rather than the actual distribution function f . Thus if the weighting function m(a; b) has m a > 0, m b = 0 so that it gives more weight to older patients with any given private bene…t b then E m ( aj T ) > E( aj T ) and the optimal degree of prioritisation is reduced (see Gravelle and Siciliani, 2006, Appendix) .
Service time di¤erences
We have followed the waiting time literature by assuming that patients with di¤erent observed bene…ts and age have the same service time. More realistically, let the service time required for a patient of type (a; b) be n(a; b) so that e¤ective demand on the …xed total capacity z is
and @w 0 =@p = D n p =D n w . The marginal e¤ect of prioritisation on the welfare function (7) is now dS(w 0 (p); p) dp
where E n ( aj I) is the "average age" of indi¤erent patients calculated using the conditional age density weighted by service time: n(a;b)f (a;b) = Râ 0 n(a;b)f (a;b)da. Thus, if service time increases with age and is una¤ected by private bene…t (i.e. n a > 0 and n b = 0), then E n ( aj I) is greater than it would be with identical service times and the marginal welfare gain from prioritisation is increased (see Gravelle and Siciliani, 2006, Appendix) . A greater degree of prioritisation is optimal because old patients have, on average, lower health gains and impose higher opportunity costs via their longer service times.
Concluding remarks
We have examined whether waiting-time prioritisation is welfare improving when health bene…ts from treatment vary among patients and are the difference between an unobservable private bene…t and an observable factor reducing the health bene…t (for example age).
Starting from a regime with no prioritisation, increasing prioritisation locally (shorter waits for the young) increases a utilitarian welfare function if the average age of the patients who are indi¤erent about receiving the treatment after some wait and not getting the treatment at all is higher than the average age of the patients who receive the treatment. Moreover, at any level of prioritisation, if the condition on average ages is satis…ed then further prioritisation increases welfare.
The average age condition is satis…ed for all prioritisation intensities if the distribution of the private bene…t is uniform (for any distribution of age) or if the distribution of age is uniform and the distribution of the private bene…t is log-concave. In this case, we have proved that the optimal prioritisation is maximal prioritisation. The reason is that in these circumstances a smaller proportion of patients with low observable bene…t demand treatment for a given wait, since the utility of the patient decreases with the observable dimension of bene…t (for example age). Prioritisation will then reduce waiting for a large group of patients with high observable bene…t (low age) at the cost of an increase in waiting of a small group of patients with low observable bene…t (high age). Intuitively, rationing by waiting imposes dead weight costs on patients with no o¤setting gain to producers, so that it should be imposed most heavily on the patients whose demand is most responsive to the waiting time. These will usually be those who demand less because they have a lower observable bene…t (higher age).
We have also shown that a more general rationing rule (threshold rationing plus prioritisation), where patients whose observable bene…t is below a threshold are not eligible for treatment, can bring further increases in welfare. Although the observable bene…t is an imperfect signal of total health gain, welfare can be higher if providers set waiting time to zero and use only the imperfect (observable) signal to ration patients.
The analysis supports explicit priority schemes, like those in Canada and New Zealand, that give shorter waits to prioritised patients and the setting of treatment thresholds so that treatment is provided with no wait to those meeting the criteria and treatment is denied to all others. When there is imperfect information on the health bene…ts of individual patients, prioritisation leads to a welfare loss because some patients with low bene…ts get treatment whilst some with higher bene…t are not treated. But this welfare loss due to a worse allocation of treatment may be more than o¤set by the welfare gain from reducing the deadweight loss imposed by waiting times on all patients receiving treatment.
Some of our results on the direction of prioritisation rely on the assumption that age and unobservable bene…t are independent. Suppose that age and unobservable bene…t are negatively correlated. This implies that age becomes a better signal of private bene…t. Therefore, we conjecture that prioritisation would be even more desirable as by favouring patients with low age, prioritisation favours patients with high private bene…t. Similarly, a positive correlation between age and unobservable bene…t would make prioritisation less desirable. 
and from (7)
af (a; b)dbda < 0.
Second derivative of welfare function
It is possible to show that (extended proof available from the authors) (i) The marginal value of introducing linear prioritisation is zero if dS dp p=0 =
, ag, and w 0 (p; z) is the waiting time for patients with a = 0. We seek conditions on the joint distribution for which (32) holds whatever the equilibrium waiting time is in the absence of prioritisation (w o (z) = w 0 (0; z)). Setting p = 0, we have b b = a + w o and b a = minfb w o ; ag. Equation (32) must hold for all z and since w o (z) decreases monotonically with supply z, this implies
and so if (32) is true for all z, then
at all positive w 0 . The …rst two terms cancel so that
and since D > 0 we require that
does not vary with w 0 . If b < 1 then E( aj I) is decreasing with w o in some neighbourhood of b. Thusâ = a and we require (ii) We want to prove that if f (a; b) = h(a)g(b) = h(a) e b , with > 0, then dS dp = 0. Sinceb = w 0 (p; z) + (1 + p)a dS dp = D 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 
is true for all p and z.
Proof of proposition 3 (a). We want to prove that if h(a) is uniform and g(b)
is strictly logconcave, then dS dp
(37) First-order stochastic dominance of the distribution of a conditional on indi¤erence over the distribution conditional on joining the list requires:
for all a 2 [0; b a] with strict inequality for some a 2 [0; b a]. We can rewrite (38) as
The left-hand side of (39) is the "mean residual lifetime function", which is strictly monotone decreasing if g(b) is strictly log-concave (see Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005, Theorem 6, p.451) . At a = 0,
and so (39) holds strictly for a 2 (0; b a].
(b). If g(b) is uniform, then for any h(a): (1 a pa + pa 0 w 0 ) da
with
> 0, where (1 a 0 w 0 ) > 0 (notice that if b = 1 and a = a 0 , then u = 1 w 0 a 0 pa 0 + pa 0 = 1 w 0 a 0 > 0). In equilibrium, demand equals supply D(w 0 ; p; a 0 ) = z and
The welfare function is
which is increasing in p for given a 0 . Hence at given a 0 , p should be increased until w 0 = 0 and so w 0 (a 0 ; p (a 0 )) = 0 and p (a 0 ) = 1 2z 2z 2a 0 +a 2 0 > 0.
With w 0 (a 0 ; p (a 0 )) = 0, the market-clearing condition reduces to
> 0, and the welfare function is
The e¤ect of an increase in a 0 on welfare is
Hence a 0 should be increased until the entire supply is given to individuals with a a (z) = 1 (1 2z) 1=2 . 
3) Patients prefer private to no treatment if: b > a + u(y) u(y k). De…ne e b(a; y) as the level of private bene…t such that e b(a; y) = a + u(y) u(y k).
There are three groups of patients: a) Public treatment: b b b(a) (better public than no treatment) and y y G (a) (better public than private treatment). b) Private treatment: b > e b(a; y) (better private than no treatment) and y > y G (a) (better private than public treatment). c) No treatment: b < b b(a) (better no treatment than public) and b < e b(a; y) (better no treatment than private). The demand for public treatment is:
where 
Non-utilitarian welfare function
Recall that E ( aj T ) = , so that E m ( aj T ) > E( aj T ).
Service time di¤erences
Recall that E n ( aj I) = or 0 f (a; b b (a)) R a 0 n a (a)F (a; b b (a))da, which is always satis…ed. Therefore, E n ( aj I) > E( aj I).
